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Abstract
Rwanda has experienced significant economic growth following the 1994Genocide. This growth is attributed to the expansion of
its agricultural sector, specifically farming intensification and the government’s focus on creating strong agriculture cooperatives.
While Rwanda’s economic development has been impressive, many academics have argued that Rwanda’s growth comes at the
cost of an authoritarian governmental regime, whose policies have too heavy a hand in the daily activities of smallholder farming.
This study measures smallholder maize farmer loyalty to their cooperatives using the net promoter scores of five different
cooperatives. Results differ from much of the recent research on smallholder farmers in Rwanda in that most cooperative
members have high levels of trust in their cooperative leaders. Cooperative members who have high levels of trust in their
cooperative president, board and the Government of Rwanda are more likely to recommend their cooperative to friends and
family. Furthermore, women cooperative members have higher levels of trust in cooperative leadership, the Government of
Rwanda and almost all agricultural input providers mentioned in the study. Findings suggest that cooperative policy, most notably
the mandatory inclusion of high numbers of women in cooperative decision-making, is helping to promote strong agricultural
institutions as well as sustainable economic development.
Keywords Rwanda . Agriculture . Cooperative . Social capital . Net promoter score
1 Introduction
Rwanda has undergone an enormous transformation since the
1994 Genocide, in which between 600,000 and 800,000 Tutsi
and moderate Hutu were murdered and virtually all of its
governmental institutions were destroyed (For a full review
of the socio-political history of the region and discussion of
the Rwandan Genocide see Prunier’s (2008) Africa’s world
war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a
continental catastrophe). In the almost two and a half decades
following the genocide, ambitious government policies aimed
to combat poverty and bring Rwanda into the global economy
have been implemented. These policies, especially as they
pertain to food production, along with support from interna-
tional donors, have produced significant economic gains in a
relatively short period of time. From 2001 to 2015 the GDP
growth rate in Rwanda has been around 8%. The poverty rate
declined from 44% in 2011 to 39% in 2014, while the Gini
Coefficient indicator of inequality dropped from 0.49 to 0.45
during the same period (World Bank 2017).
Much of the success in poverty reduction and economic
growth can be attributed to a stable political environment in
Rwanda and, especially in contrast to many other sub-Saharan
African nations, a low level of political corruption. Moreover,
Rwanda has received praise from academics and advocacy
groups for its policies to mandate a strong representation of
women in government. The Government of Rwanda officially
established national gender quotas in government in the
Constitution signed in 2003. Legislation requires that 30%
of the representative government consists of women. One
hope from this is to increase the influence of women in na-
tional and local governance, which has seen some success
(Burnet 2008). To put this in perspective, the World Bank
(2018) ranks Rwanda first according to the percentage of
women in parliaments in the world in 2018 – a title Rwanda
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has held since 2012. The proportion of seats held bywomen in
the Rwanda Parliament has steadily increased from 17.1% in
1997 to 63.8% in 2016. The Government of Rwanda’s policy
on gender equality has also been successful in symbolically
inspiring women to pursue leadership positions in their local
communities, and this has led to a higher representation of
women in government than is constitutionally required. This
policy also helped to produce a substantial increase in women
membership and leadership in agricultural cooperatives; a se-
rious reservation being, however, that gender equality does
not exist in homes, and that women representation in govern-
ment is still highly influenced by the government, which over-
sees all aspects of the electoral process and women candidacy
(Burnet 2011). Nonetheless, it is impressive that in June of
2016, 64% of the members of the national parliament were
women (Warner 2016). Moreover, women in the cooperative
focus groups involved in the current study were as assertive as
the men in presenting their points of view.
There is no question, however, that the country’s current
stability has been achieved with authoritarian, one-party rule.
The current governing party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front
headed by President Paul Kagame, has been in power since
its military leaders ended the genocide in summer 1994, and
has implemented a strict policy which has been called, “. . . the
world’s boldest experiment in transitional justice, comprehen-
sive land tenure and agricultural reform, forced villagization, a
de facto ban on ethnic identity, reeducation of the population,
and the systematic redrawing and renaming of Rwanda’s ter-
ritory, among other things” (Straus and Waldrof 2011, p. 4).
These policies are set within the framework of the govern-
ment’s “Genocide Remembrance” policy in which strong laws
regulating public behavior are seen as the only way to prevent a
re-emergence of inter-ethnic conflict and violence (Clark 2018).
Critics, however, question whether this authoritarian policy will
produce long-term stability in the agricultural sector, let alone build
the civil society institutions of liberal democracy (Huggins 2014).
Rwandan agricultural policy, in which cooperatives play a
key role, has been subject to the same mixed reviews as those
given to overall government economic policy. On the one
hand, it is clear that there have been substantial gains in the
agricultural sector and that agricultural policy is viewed as an
essential feature of economic development. The Government
of Rwanda holds considerable influence in the organization of
the agricultural sector, including land ownership, the purchase
of agricultural inputs and decisions on what crops to grow.
This high level of control is found in nearly all levels of the
agriculture supply chain, and it is clearly moving the country
towards a more modern agricultural sector in which land and
farms are privatized (Gready 2010).
Indeed, growth in Rwanda’s agriculture sector has been im-
pressive. In 2007 the Government of Rwanda implemented the
Crop Intensification Program (CIP), and, following positive mar-
ket growth, the government has pushed for further intensification
practices, a flagship of which is the implementation of agriculture
cooperatives in the country (Kathiresan 2011). Figure 1 illustrates
the cumulative growth of new cooperatives in Rwanda. Since
2009 - the earliest year with reliable data - there has been a
substantial growth of cooperatives. As of 2018 there are just
under 8000 cooperatives listed in the Rwanda Cooperative
Agency cooperative directory database. On average, 790 (sd =
226.0) new cooperatives are added each year. Cooperatives were
added at similar rates across provinces at first, but since 2013
cooperatives in the West Province have been created at higher
rates than in other provinces. As of 2018, the West Province has
2010 cooperatives. Kigali, the capital, comprised of mostly urban
areas, has the lowest number of cooperatives registered in the
dataset at 1,156.
There is evidence that this growth is due, in part at least, to
the cooperative membership for smallholder farmers when
compared to non-member farmers. Verhofstadt and Maertens
(2014) found that farm income per worker increased by about
40% for cooperative members when compared to non-mem-
bers. However, the Government of Rwanda’s heavy hand in
agriculture policy means that government policy is likely to
influence the social networks of peasant farmers, and thus
may influence the way in which members participate in their
cooperative. While some academics do acknowledge that this
approach to economic development may, in fact, be working –
or, at least, one cannot justifiably say that it will not work
based on evidence presented thus far (Harrison 2016) – others
suggest that it has had a negative impact on the social rela-
tionships and trust among small-holding farmers. Critics point
to the overall lack of dialogue between the government and
farmer, with interactions between the two more often happen-
ing on an ad hoc basis (Gready 2010). This lack of communi-
cation, it is argued, results in a one-way flow of information,
which is often communicated to the farmer through the coop-
erative. Furthermore, Huggins (2009) contends that coopera-
tive membership was in many respects compulsory for small-
holder farmers in 2009 just after implementation of the CIP in
2007, and that members, “know little about how they [the
cooperatives] function or what membership entails. .. [they]
expressed concern about a lack of transparency, recounting
that in the past, cooperatives had collapsed due to corruption”
(Huggins 2009, p. 300). Huggins goes on to argue that the lack
of autonomy and agency of small-holder farmers in Rwanda,
leads to “significant degrees of dissatisfaction” of cooperative
members (Huggins 2014, p. 380).
These conflicting assessments of Rwandan agricultural
policies, and in particular cooperative development, poses an
important research question: to what extent do Rwandan
smallholder farmer members view their cooperatives in a pos-
itive or negative way? Are they satisfied with the performance
of these cooperatives, and, most important, do women and
men members trust the cooperatives to pursue their interests
in the long-run?
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2 Theory
This study uses social capital theory as a theoretical frame-
work due to the importance of social capital in building suc-
cessful and sustainable agriculture cooperatives in the West
and in the Global South. Given Rwanda’s recent history,
which culminated with genocide in 1994 and civil unrest in
the year immediately following, it is important to review the
theoretical components of social capital – namely, bonding
and bridging social capital. Special attention is given to the
role of government policy and institutions in helping to build
and promote social capital in the form of trust.
Agriculture cooperatives emerged in the nineteenth century
in Western countries to provide collective, countervailing
power for small farmers in the marketplace. In the United
States, for example, cooperatives historically provided lever-
age vis-à-vis railroads that shipped farmers’ grain, as well as
silo operators who purchased that grain and input suppliers,
who provided seeds, fuel and fertilizer at lowered costs. A
critical element in the formation of these cooperatives was
their ability to maintain the loyalty of their members through
high levels of trust that was generated through long-term co-
operation in small-town schools, churches and farms
(Schneiberg et al. 2008).
Trust is a form of social capital that can produce both physical
and human capital (Coleman 1988). Putnam (1995, p. 225) ex-
plains that “social capital refers to features of social organization
such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordina-
tion and cooperation for mutual benefit”. Thus, cooperatives in
the United States have had a social capital advantage over other
types of organizations insofar as the trust of their members per-
mits them to engage in long-range planningwithout the pressures
for immediate return that plague investor-owned firms.
Agricultural cooperatives have been able to introduce new tech-
nologies and new market opportunities in areas with which their
farmer-members were previously unfamiliar; with sources of in-
formation that were outside of the purview of their small-town
experience. In effect, then, cooperatives were able to use the
initial bonding social capital trust based on their small-town ex-
perience to build bridging social capital (Woolcock and Narayan
2000) that, in turn, increased their ability to build successful
business models. Eventually cooperatives were able to success-
fully lobby to pass legislation at the state and national levels, such
as exemption from anti-trust laws, which provided farmers with
additional advantages (Cook 1995; Schneiberg et al. 2008).
Still today, multi-million-dollar cooperatives depend upon
the trust of their members in a way that is not found in
investor-owned firms. In a recent study of cooperative perfor-
mance in the U.S., the level of social capital, measured by
structures for communication between members and the
board, especially feedback loops so that members could pro-
vide input into board decisions, was found to be a more im-
portant predictor of member satisfaction and overall financial
success than some strictly accounting factors that are found to
be more important in the success of investor-owned firms
(Cook & Burress 2013). These social capital advantages have
made it possible for cooperatives to be more resilient than
investor-owned firms in adapting to the ups and downs in
the macro-economies and markets in which they operate.
One goal of cooperative development projects in Sub-
Saharan Africa is to provide countervailing power for
farmer-members vis-à-vis input suppliers and processors –
something they share with cooperatives in the developed
world. Countervailing power eventually provides for vertical
integration into the value chain, whereby cooperatives begin
to operate processing facilities themselves (Meador et al.
2016; O’Brien et al. 2013). These emerging cooperatives also
share the need to develop and maintain social capital among
their members to induce them to adopt new agricultural tech-
nologies as well as invest in long-term capitalization projects.
The latter is especially difficult because it implies foregoing
some immediate gains for some future benefit that is by no
means guaranteed. Moreover, such long-term investments re-
quire accessing information and working with organizations
Fig. 1 Cumulative growth of
Rwandan Cooperatives since
2009 by Province
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and individuals with whom village-level cooperative mem-
bers are not familiar. In short, this requires emerging cooper-
ative members to trust the management as they pursue objec-
tives that involve building bridging social capital.
In addition to the obvious challenges of entering markets in
a globalized economy, cooperatives in developing countries
also face the challenge of not having existed long enough to
develop a legacy of social capital underpinning adaptation to
different challenges. While there was some indigenous devel-
opment of cooperatives in the colonial period, the colonial
masters essentially developed cooperatives to funnel raw ag-
ricultural commodities towards the colonising country for pro-
cessing, leaving the African members with little control over
the operation of their cooperatives (Holmen 1990).
The challenge of building social capital within these small-
holder cooperatives, then, has typically fallen upon post-
colonial governments, with the assistance of various interna-
tional governmental and non-governmental aid organizations
as is the case in Rwanda (Verhofstadt and Maertens 2014).
The World Bank and other international development institu-
tions have taken notice of and adopted a framework around
social capital following the rise of literature on the topic in the
1990s, articulated in the writings of Woolcock and Narayan
(2000). Their central point is that for development to succeed,
emerging economies need to develop social capital. In an eco-
nomic development context, bridging ties help social actors to
diversify their stock of social capital, and it is, in many ways,
analogous to Granovetter’s (1973) notion of weak social ties.
Actors with high levels of bridging social capital are more
likely to receive information about economic opportunities
and access to other resources with which to take advantage
of those opportunities. The critical question, then is can bridg-
ing capital be developed where it is currently weak or absent?
A program by the Government of Rwanda to build agricul-
tural cooperatives as a central element in the overall economic
development plan for the country is especially relevant in
testing the extent to which bridging social capital can be built.
The Government of Rwanda has introduced an aggressive
cooperative policy which is set within a larger framework that
employs somewhat authoritarian methods to build civil soci-
ety. The question addressed in this paper is, to what extent do
smallholder farmers accept this model?
Because of the well-documented growth of the Rwandan
economy and the apparent success of the government in over-
coming the effects of the genocide of the 1990s, the govern-
ment’s efforts to build agricultural cooperatives provides a
unique opportunity for research on the ability of governments
and their international supporters to build social capital. The
government’s program in this area has received mixed re-
views, with some observers praising it for its developmental
success, while critics have charged that the program is in fact
authoritarian, forcing farmers to participate in cooperatives
(Gready 2010; Huggins 2014).
The project described below provides us with an opportu-
nity to assess the extent to which cooperative members are
supportive of the government’s program and, most important,
to measure the extent to which social capital is associated with
overall member loyalty.
A cooperative seed development project initiated by the
Government of Rwanda, with funding from USAID and techni-
cal assistance from Land O′ Lakes International Development,
provides an opportunity to assess the relationship between social
capital perceptions among cooperative members and their overall
satisfaction with cooperative performance. The project was de-
signed to utilize smallholder grain cooperatives as a mechanism
to facilitate smallholder farmers’ access to newer scientifically
based technology that would improve their production and
household income and, in turn, increase the efficiency of
Rwandan agriculture as a whole. Cooperative members were
asked to trust their cooperatives in the development of the latter
in bridging social capital, as they connected to outside sources of
farm supplies and technical assistance.
The specific focus of this project is to identify the impact of
differing levels of trust that smallholder maize cooperative mem-
bers have for input suppliers within the larger policy framework.
Adopting new input approaches requires members, who lack
formal training in agronomy, to accept the promise of more pro-
ductivity and income, but with inputs with which they were not
familiar. This paper focuses on the level of trust of cooperative
members in the various organizations involved in the project,
including the input suppliers - private seed and fertilizer compa-
nies, the Rwandan Cooperative Development Agency, and the
cooperatives themselves, as well as the relationship between
members’ trust of those organizations and their overall satisfac-
tion with their cooperatives.
3 Methods
The findings reported here are based on a quantitative survey
conducted in 2015 on five maize cooperatives in Rwanda.
Prior to the development of the survey instrument, focus
groups were held with all cooperatives included in the study
as well as representatives from two privately-owned agricul-
tural input suppliers and a bank, which provides loans to co-
operatives and members. The focus groups informed the sur-
vey instrument, which consisted of questions on members’
levels of trust in the various organizations involved in the
project as well as overall satisfaction with the cooperative.
3.1 Focus groups and questionnaire development
Focus groups were held prior to the development of the survey
instrument to help in survey and question design and to help
inform the research team of underlying levels of social cohesion.
Each focus group was held on-site at each cooperative and was
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attended by cooperative members, those in leadership positions,
the cooperative accountant and agronomist. Walking tours of the
cooperatives and of some farms were conducted during this time
as well. Variables were specifically included in the survey instru-
ment to measure variations in levels of social capital and overall
satisfaction with the cooperative.
The focus group plan followed a semi-structured list of topic
questions, which focused on cooperative performance metrics
(commodity outputs, proportion of yield sold versus consumed,
the prevalence of hawkers [i.e. informal buyers], and member
composition). Focus groups ranged in size from 8 to 15members
and included a mix of men and women, with the smallest pro-
portion of women attendees being 30% and the largest being
60%. In addition to identifying appropriate questions to include
in the questionnaire, the research team was also interested in
obtaining a view of the underlying social cohesion. Overall, both
men and women participants spoke up about issues they faced
and aspects of the cooperative they liked and disliked at approx-
imately the same rate. Most importantly, women participants did
not appear to be shy about voicing their opinions and took an
active role throughout the process.
Table 1 provides an overview of all questions included in
the bivariate analysis and models. Table 1 contains each var-
iable name, a short description of what the variable measures,
and the variable type.
3.2 Cooperatives
Three cooperatives are located in the East Province and two
cooperatives were located in the South Province. Individual
cooperatives are located in different districts and sectors with-
in their respective provinces. Five different cooperatives were
chosen in order to allow for variation in key variables of in-
terest. Considering cooperatives with different founding dates
is important as it relates to the CIP policy, implemented in
2007, as older cooperatives likely have different experiences
with the government’s implementation of the new policy than
more recent ones. The oldest cooperative in the study was
formed in June of 2009; the most recent cooperative was
formed in September of 2013. Cooperatives were chosen at
geographical locations in order to allow for the influence that
different regional governmental bodies (i.e., district agrono-
mist and RAB representatives) may have on member trust.
Cooperatives were also chosen to account for further variation
in the social and economic demographics and farming char-
acteristics of the cooperatives. Province locations were chosen
due to the tendency of cooperatives in the East and Southern
provinces to grow maize.
3.3 Sample
A systematic random sampling design was used to select respon-
dents from each cooperative in the study. A member registry list
was obtained and a randomly selected starting point selected for
each cooperative. A sample size of 50 respondents was taken
from each cooperative for a total sample size of 250. In addition
to the original 250-member sampling frame, a repository list of 20
respondents from each cooperative (100 total) was taken to serve
as a bank of respondents in case any of the original 250 respon-
dents opted not to be included in the study. Respondents were
interviewed in-person by local persons trained in data collection
techniques. The study had an opt-in rate of about 80%, and the
survey yielded a 100% completion rate. The sample included the
demographic characteristics of cooperative members, including:
age, gender, household structure andmarital status. Research team
members based in Rwanda identified ten survey enumerators, all
of whom are Rwandan and fluent in Kinyarwandan. They
underwent a training course that reviewed the purpose of the
study, the questionnaire, and the sampling design. Enumerators
were encouraged to answer respondent questions regarding the
purpose of the survey and to make ad hoc adjustments to expla-
nations of survey questions in the field when necessary.
3.4 Net promoter score
Two sets of measures were used in the study. The first, a
measure of social capital, was measured using a Likert scale,
with ‘1’ being ‘Not very trustworthy’ to ‘5’ being ‘Very trust-
worthy’ that provided an indication of the trust level of coop-
erative members toward specific persons or organizations that
could provide information and support for their farm-level
decisions. These included cooperative leadership, local
leaders, government agencies responsible for cooperatives,
private sector input suppliers, relatives and religious leaders.
The second measure was the Net Promoter Score (NPS),
which was used as an indicator of members’ overall level of
satisfaction with their cooperative. The NPS was developed to
measure customer and firm satisfaction (Reichheld 2003) and has
been used to indicate member loyalty in a variety of organiza-
tional contexts – private sector, non-governmental, and govern-
mental (Delgado-Ballester and Luis Munuera-Alemán 2005).
The first step in creating a NPS is to ask the following ques-
tion: “On a ten-point scale, with 1 being low and 10 being high,
how likely is it that you would recommend this organization to a
friend or colleague?” (Reichheld 2003). Responses are then
recoded into three nominal categories: ‘0’ to ‘6’ are coded as
‘detractors’; ‘7’ and ‘8’ are coded as ‘passives’; and ‘9’ and
‘10’ are coded as ‘promoters.’Then the percentage of ‘detractors’
is subtracted from the percentage of ‘promoters’ to provide the
NPS score. Thus, NPS can range from −100 to 100. In this study,
NPS is used to measure cooperative member satisfaction and
loyalty. For the purposes of this study, respondents were catego-
rized into ‘detractors’, ‘passives’ and ‘promoters’ in Fig. 3 and
the subsequent discussion. We keep the variable original struc-
ture, measuring from 1 to 10 for the Poisson regression model
shown below in Table 3. Keeping the variable coded on a scale
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from1 to 10 formodelling – instead of categorising it – allows for
more power and precision in the model (Harrell Jr 2015).
Three statistical approaches are provided in the following
section. First, univariate descriptive analysis is provided,
along with an approximation of each cooperative’s location,
presented in Fig. 2. Bivariate statistics are presented in Figs. 3
and 4 as well as in Table 2. For Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, a series of
chi-square tests of independence have been run on each vari-
able and their respective dependent variables, gender and NPS
category. Table 2 is analysed using the F-distribution and
global test of significance. Table 3 shows each of the four
equations used in statistical modelling. The model used is a
Poisson regression model, which is an appropriate and robust
approach to modelling count data (Coxe et al. 2009). A
Poisson regression model has the following form:
loglog E xð Þð Þ ¼ aþ B0 xð Þ þ e
The four models are implemented in a series of equations
listed across the top of each column. The coefficients show the
strength of the relationship between trust in a specific
organization or other entity as well as the direction of that
relationship, i.e., either positive or negative. Results are pre-
sented in a block design with each equation including the new
coefficients in addition to the preceding equation. Model co-
efficients are standardized and values less than 0 indicate a
negative impact while values over 0 indicate a positive impact.
4 Results
4.1 Overall descriptive statistics
Figure 2 shows a map of the approximate locations of the
cooperatives included in the study. Cities or large towns, with
populations of 10,000 or more, are included as well as the
capital, Kigali. District boundaries, which specify intermedi-
ate administrative geographies, are depicted within the base
map. The cooperatives are spread out geographically between
districts, with no two cooperatives occupying the same dis-
trict. No cooperative is in close proximity to the mountains in
the north or lake region in the west.
Table 1 Variable descriptions
Variable name Description Type
African seed company II Regional agricultural firm based in East Africa Likert 1–5 scale
African seed company I Regional agricultural firm based in Africa
U.S. agro-chemical company International agriculture research and supply firm
European agro-chemical company Large, international agricultural firm specializing in fertilizer
Agro Dealer Sells agriculture inputs
Rwanda Agriculture Board (RAB) Agency that oversees and promotes agricultural development
Cooperative Management Committee Oversees cooperative decisions, comprised of 6 to 10 cooperative members
Cooperative President Elected leader of cooperative; cooperative member
Cooperative Manager Handles day-to-day business in cooperative; cooperative member
Cooperative Agronomist Lead agronomist for cooperative
Zone Leaders Elected to represent cooperative sub zones, boundaries; cooperative member
Cooperative Accountant Oversees cooperative finances. Usually college educated. Not a cooperative member
District Agronomist Regional agronomist assigned to each administrative district
My village leaders Local village leaders including formal and informal leadership
My relatives Relatives, including primary and secondary
Sector Agronomist Regional agronomist assigned to each administrative district
Radio FM/AM Radio Broadcasters
Television Local/cable television providers
My neighbors Village or plot neighbors
My church or mosque Center of worship if applicable
Gender Reference is man Nominal; asked binary
Marital status
(married is reference)
Reference is married Nominal; Married,
single and widowed
Age Respondents were asked their age in years Continuous
Cooperative Coop 1 is reference; 5 Cooperatives, 50 sampled from each. Nominal
NPS Net Promoter Score Count, scale of 1 to 10
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Figure 2 provides a descriptive analysis of the percent
of women, mean age and mean NPS for each coopera-
tive. The percentage of women members varies consid-
erably between cooperatives, from Cooperative D hav-
ing just under a quarter of woman membership to
Cooperative E, which has 53.5% women membership.
The mean ages for cooperatives range between about
42 to just under 50 years. The average NPS score (on
a 10-point scale) ranges between 7.21 and 9.17 with
Cooperative B having the lowest NPS mean score and
Cooperative A having the highest.
4.2 Members’ levels of Trust of Different Sources
of information
Figure 3 shows the members’ level of trust of cooperative
leadership, various sources of information and support for
their farm activities for the total sample and by gender. In
Fig. 3 the black line representsmeanwomen trust levels, while
the grey line represents trust levels of men. Respondents were
asked to rate their level of trust on 20 different individuals and
organisations that associated with their agriculture and their
cooperative. These 20 items have been grouped as: 1)
Fig. 2 Cooperative location, description and proximity to urban areas. Locations are approximate
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Cooperative leader; 2) Government institution; 3) Social insti-
tution; 4) Media; and, 5) Agri-business. An overall group
mean and standard deviation is shown beneath the group la-
bels. Figure 3 shows important differences between the levels
of trust from men and women; in general, women are more
trusting thanmen, with women having an overall average trust
of 3.35 (SD = 1.6) and men having an overall average trust of
3.00 (SD = 1.6) [χ2 (2) = 56.22, p < .001].
Overall, respondents have the highest level of trust in the
Rwanda Agriculture Board (RAB), the governmental agency in
charge of developing cooperatives and integrating their operations
into the larger economic development plan for agriculture; a score
of 4.32 (SD= 1.1) on a scale of 1 to 5. Close behind are the mean
levels of trust in the officers of the cooperative; levels of trust then
decline with the district agronomist, to the radio, village leaders,
churches, neighbours, television and private sector seed suppliers.
The lowestmean score of 2.0was given to a seed supplier that is a
subsidiary of an international agro-chemical company. The
highest ratings were given to the governmental agency and the
cooperative leadership, which runs counter to the critics’ claim of
the lack of support among members for the cooperatives.
In general, the trend lines for both women and men mem-
bers show high levels of trust in government agriculture insti-
tutions and cooperative leadership. There is less overall trust
in input suppliers for both women and men. Chi–square tests
indicate that women members have higher trust in four spe-
cific areas: the Rwanda Agricultural Board; cooperative man-
agers; the cooperative management committee, and the
European Agro-Chemical Company.
4.3 Overall level of loyalty to the cooperative
Of the 250 respondents among the five cooperatives, there were
146 promoter cooperative members (i.e., respondents who an-
swered a 9 or 10 to the question ‘Would you recommend the
cooperative to a friend or relative?’ 1–10), or 58.3%; there were
66 passive cooperative members, or 26.2%; and there were 38
detractor cooperative members, or 15.5%. The proportional dif-
ference between promoter type and cooperative is statistically
significant at the 0.01 alpha level [χ2 (8) = 20.71, p < .01)].
The age of cooperative members was given careful consid-
eration in the study, since different age cohorts may have had
quite different experiences with respect to the genocide and
the way that it affected their view of cooperatives which were
framed within the government’s mandate to encourage multi-
ethnic participation in each individual local organization.
The mean age for all respondents in the sample was 46.5,
with a standard deviation of 12.29; the mean age for women
was 47.12, with a standard deviation of 11.79; and the mean
age for men was 46.05, with a standard deviation of 12.67.
The difference in mean age between women and men was just
over 1 year and is not statistically significant (1.1, P = 0.431).
The mean age for cooperative promoters was 47.02, with a
standard deviation of 12.92; the mean age for cooperative
passives was 45.29, with a standard deviation of 10.31; and
the mean age for cooperative detractors was 46.63, with a
standard deviation of 13.1. The difference between net pro-
moter means is not statistically significant (P = 0.633).
The mean age for cooperative members who are married was
45.78, with a standard deviation of 12.01; the mean age for co-
operativemembers whowerewidowswas 53.61, with a standard
deviation of 10.49; and the mean age for cooperative members
who were single was 33.5, with a standard deviation of 8.22. The
difference between the mean age of marital status is statistically
significant (P = 0.049). Marital status and mean NPS scores are
shown in Table 2 along with frequency rates and standard errors.
The respondents who were single (i.e. not married or
widowed) constitute the largest proportion of net promoters from
any group at about 90% with a mean of 9.60; the remaining
(about 10%) were classified as passive members. The proportion
of single net promoters was substantially higher than both mar-
ried and widowed members. However, the total number of re-
spondents who were single in the total sample was quite low,
with a total of only 10 respondents in this category.
Fig. 3 CooperativeMembers’Trust of Specific Organization and individuals – Total Sample and byGender. Scale – 1 to 5, with 5 = highest level of trust.
Error bars are 95% CI. Test of significance conducted using chi–square *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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The percentage of net promoters among widows was 60%,
with a mean of about 8.55; the percentage of married respon-
dents classified as net promoters was about 56%, with a mean
of 8.09. Furthermore, the highest proportions of detractors
were individuals who were married, at 18.1%; widows had
the lowest proportion of detractors with just over 7 %. The
proportional difference between all levels in marital status and
promoter type is not statistically significant [χ2 (4) = 8.01, p =
0.066]. The difference in promoter score between men and
women is small, 0.5, which is not statistically significant [χ2
(10) = 12.21, p = 0.271].
4.4 Multivariate tests showing the impact of social
capital trust on net promoter scores
Multivariate analysis was conducted to enable a further under-
standing of the impact that social capital has on the likelihood
that a cooperative member is a Net Promoter. Trust scores are
used in a Poisson regression model to predict Net Promoter
scores. -.
Figure 4 shows the mean levels of trust for cooperative
‘detractors’, ‘passives’ and ‘promoters.’ Trust items have been
grouped as: 1) Cooperative leader; 2) Government institution;
3) Social institution; 4) Media; and, 5) Agri-business. An
overall group mean and standard deviation is shown beneath
the group labels. The general trend is similar to that of Fig. 3.
On average, ‘detractors’, ‘passives’ and ‘promoters’ tend to
have higher levels of trust in the cooperative leadership than in
private input suppliers. The error bars show the 95% confi-
dence intervals of parameter estimates between the three pro-
moter types in their levels of trust for each category of indi-
viduals and organizations. A noteworthy finding, though not
statistically significant according to the chi–square tests, is the
“promoters” higher levels of trust towards the cooperative
president, agronomist, accountant and village leaders, com-
pared to the “passives” and the “detractors”. Figure 4 shows
that, overall, ‘promoters’ report nominally higher levels of
trust around cooperative leadership, while ‘detractors’ have
the highest levels of trust in agricultural input suppliers.
Table 3 shows the results of four Poisson regression
models, indicating how trust in different sources of agricultur-
al information are associated, either positively or negatively,
with overall member loyalty to the cooperative. A discussion
of each equation is presented in the following sections.
4.4.1 Equation 1: Input providers
The first model includes input suppliers. As a respondent’s
trust increases in the U.S. agro-chemical company, his/her
cooperative promoter score decreases. This trend is negative
and significant throughout all four models. Alternatively, as a
respondent’s trust increases in the European agro-chemical
company so too does his/her promoter score. This trend con-
tinues until the fourth model, where it disappears when demo-
graphics and cooperative are added.
4.4.2 Equation 2: Cooperative management
A high level of trust in the cooperative agronomist is positive-
ly associated with high promoter scores as is a high level of
trust in the cooperative accountant. In addition, the Rwandan
Agricultural Board has a positive and significant association
with promoter score, and the sector agronomist has a negative
and significant association with promoter score. The coeffi-
cient for the U.S. agro-chemical company remains negative.
Fig. 4 Trust of individuals and organizations by three promoter types (DP) Scale – 1 to 5, with 5 = highest level of trust. Error bars are 95% CI. Test of
significance conducted using chi–square *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Table 2 Marital status and net promoter type
Marital status mean freq se
Married (n = 197) 8.09 79.3% 0.19
Single(n = 10) 9.60 4.0% 0.22
Widow(n = 41) 8.55 16.7% 0.36
Total 8.23 100% 0.16
ANOVA: F(3, = 2.418), p = 0.049
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4.4.3 Equation 3: Relatives and community members
Equation three adds variables that measure trust in the village
leader, relatives and neighbors and church or mosque. High
levels of trust in one’s relatives are associated with low pro-
moter scores, while trust in one’s village leader is associated
with high promoter scores. Covariates from equations one and
two remain unchanged.
4.4.4 Equation 4: Controls
Equation four adds gender and other control variables to the
model. Marital status and gender are statistically significant in
the overall model. Single respondents are more likely to have
higher promoter scores than married respondents. There is no
difference statistically for widowed respondents and married
respondents. Women respondents are more likely to have pos-
itive promoter scores than their male counterparts.
4.5 Model fit
The model fit was assessed using both the Cox-Snell and
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 values. These values are analogous to
the R2 in an ordinary least squares regression. There is a pro-
gressive increase in both measures of model fit for each mod-
el. With the full model, eq. 4, explaining close to 50% of the
total variance. In addition, the −2 Log-Likelihood statistic is
provided for each equation. In general, the −2 Log-Likelihood
decreases with each iteration of the model, which suggest
better model fit for each iteration.
5 Conclusions
The analysis presented above provides some clarification of
the mixed reviews of the Rwandan cooperative model. At a
minimum, there were more “promoters” of the cooperatives
than there were either “passives” or “detractors.” Most telling
Table 3 Poisson regression: predicting promoter score (1–10) by trust of specific organizations and individuals
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
log (NPS) log (NPS) log (NPS) log (NPS)
(Intercept) 1.03 *** 1.27 *** 1.24 *** 1.15 ***
African seed company II 0.1 0.06 −0.06 −0.02
African seed company I −0.13 −0.2 −0.07 −0.05
U.S. agro-chemical company −0.42 ** −0.39 * −0.42 ** −0.40 *
European agro-chemical company 0.23 0.21 0.32 * 0.26
Agro Dealer 0.05 −0.13 −0.02 0.04
Rwanda Agriculture Board (RAB) 0.42 *** 0.42 *** 0.39 **
Cooperative Management Committee 0.24 0.24 0.21
Cooperative President 0.04 0.04 −0.07
Cooperative Manager 0.01 −0.09 −0.15
Cooperative Agronomist 0.32 * 0.43 ** 0.45 **
Zone Leaders −0.06 0.05 0.06
Cooperative Accountant 0.19 0.13 0.27 *
District Agronomist 0.08 0.12 0.17
My village leaders 0.43 ** 0.42 **
My relatives −0.29 * −0.26 *
Sector Agronomist −0.52 *** −0.51 ***
Radio −0.07 0.02
Television −0.14 −0.25
My neighbors −0.12 −0.21
My church or mosque 0.25 0.11
Gender (reference is male) 0.29 *
Marital status (married is reference)
Single 1.54 **
Widow 0.34
Age 0.01
Cooperative (Coop 1 is reference)
Coop 2 −0.41 *
Coop 3 −0.33
Coop 4 −0.16
Coop 5 0.35
Observations 248 248 248 248
Cox-Snell Pseudo R2 0.176 0.279 0.38 0.489
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 0.177 0.282 0.383 0.495
−2 Log-Likelihood 1109.113 1075.777 1038.572 990.474
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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is the observation that higher levels of support for the cooper-
ative were associated with high levels of trust in the govern-
ment agency that provides subsidies for maize and is most
directly responsible for cooperative policy, the Rwandan
Agricultural Board, as well as cooperative leadership and
technical advisors, including the cooperative agronomist and
accountant. These positive associations would seem to pro-
vide support for the overall Government of Rwanda plan of
utilizing the cooperative as a primary vehicle for bringing
smallholder members into scientific agriculture and eventually
the global agro-business system. These relationships, then,
provide convincing evidence that it is possible to create bridg-
ing social capital if the cooperative itself, as well as its gov-
ernment sponsor, has generated high levels of bonding social
capital among its members.
Conversely, the smaller number of detractors tend to place
greater trust in less expansive relationships, such as their own
relatives, as well as the private sector input providers, espe-
cially a multi-national American based company.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the willingness of
individual cooperative members to express quite high levels
of trust in specific organizations and entities, including their
own cooperative presents a very different picture of political
life from that presented by the government’s most severe
critics. These findings do not discount the authoritarian ele-
ments in the government’s policies, but rather note that appar-
ently a substantial portion of the Rwandan citizenry, at least in
the agricultural sector appears to be satisfied with the program,
especially women.
The results provide strong evidence that the Government of
Rwanda’s agriculture policies, although authoritarian in na-
ture, are providing farmers in maize cooperatives with stabil-
ity in market access that coincides with high levels of member
trust in cooperative leadership. Moreover, the policy of requir-
ing women participation in leadership positions within coop-
eratives appears to be working. While no causal relationship
between symbolic inspiration and women leadership should
be made based on this study, it is noteworthy that women
cooperative members do have higher overall net promoter
scores than their male counterparts. Furthermore, women par-
ticipants have higher levels of trust in almost all measured
variables than their male counterparts (see Fig. 3, Section 5).
In regard to the question of whether or not this approach to
food policy in developing countries is sustainable or not re-
mains to be seen in Rwanda. Clearly, Rwanda is unique in
terms of the absolute disruption of all political, economic and
social institutions following the genocide in 1994. In 2016, the
constitutional changes weremade to allow President Kagame to
run for another presidential term, which he won in an over-
whelming victory –without any real opposition. These changes
allow the current president to remain in office until 2033, if he
should be successful in reelection. Certainly, it seems that agri-
cultural policy in Rwanda is tied to the current regime, and, any
change in this regime may result in significant policy changes.
Moreover, given the authoritarian nature of the current regime,
there is likely to be some degree of fear of repercussions asso-
ciated with speaking out against the government. Although the
extent to which fear of speaking out influences the results is
difficult to quantify, it should not be discounted. The critical
question that remains to be answered is, what will happen in the
post-Kagame era? Therefore, results presented in this paper are
not appropriate to judge the effectiveness of these policies in the
long run; in the short run, however, they appear to be working.
Subsequent studies on Rwanda agricultural policies should
focus on differences in social capital and promoter scores
between individual cooperatives as well as the efforts of the
model to link locally-based primary cooperatives to more
complex federated organizational structures. Linking primary
cooperatives with federated representation to foreign markets
is a policy ambition for the Government of Rwanda. Linking
cooperatives with wider representation in federated coopera-
tives means that there must be a high level of bonding and
bridging social capital present, as trust will be a key compo-
nent in this task.
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